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Introduction: Community health workers (CHWs) have been proposed as a means for bridging gaps in healthcare
delivery in rural communities. Recent CHW programmes have been shown to improve child and neonatal health
outcomes, and it is increasingly being suggested that paid CHWs become an integral part of health systems.
Remuneration of CHWs can potentially effect their motivation and focus. Broadly, programmes follow a social,
monetary or mixed market approach to remuneration. Conscious understanding of the differences, and of what
each has to offer, is important in selecting the most appropriate approach according to the context.
Case descriptions: The objective of this review is to identify and examine different remuneration models of CHWs
that have been utilized in large-scale sustained programmes to gain insight into the effect that remuneration has
on the motivation and focus of CHWs. A MEDLINE search using Ovid SP was undertaken and data collected from
secondary sources about CHW programmes in Iran, Ethiopia, India, Bangladesh and Nepal. Five main approaches
were identified: part-time volunteer CHWs without regular financial incentives, volunteers that sell health-related
merchandise, volunteers with financial incentives, paid full-time CHWs and a mixed model of paid and volunteer
CHWs.
Discussion and evaluation: Both volunteer and remunerated CHWs are potentially effective and can bring
something to the health arena that the other may not. For example, well-trained, supervised volunteers and
full-time CHWs who receive regular payment, or a combination of both, are more likely to engage the community
in grass-roots health-related empowerment. Programmes that utilize minimal economic incentives to part-time
CHWs tend to limit their focus, with financially incentivized activities becoming central. They can, however, improve
outcomes in well-circumscribed areas. In order to maintain benefits from different approaches, there is a need to
distinguish between CHWs that are trained and remunerated to be a part of an existing health system and those
who, with little training, take on roles and are motivated by a range of contextual factors. Governments and
planners can benefit from understanding the programme that can best be supported in their communities,
thereby maximizing motivation and effectiveness.
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Community health workers
Community health workers (CHWs) have been defined
as lay persons who have received some training to
deliver healthcare services but are not professionals [1].
Broadly, CHWs can be viewed as individuals whose pri-
mary role is to extend the reach of the existing main-
stream health system [2] or playing a broader role by
serving as cultural mediators or change agents by facili-
tating grass-roots community engagement to improve
health outcomes [2-4]. They have been proposed as a
means of bridging the gap in the current health systems
in many low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) but
have also shown promise, particularly with chronic dis-
ease management in high-income countries [5,6]. Re-
cent studies have shown that when CHWs are well
trained and supervised they can positively impact out-
comes in maternal and child health:
“CHW’s are most effective when supported by a
clinically skilled health workforce, particularly for
maternal health, and deployed within the context of
an appropriately financed primary health care system.
However, CHW’s have also notably proven crucial in
settings where the overall primary health care system
is weak, particularly in improving child and neonatal
health. They also represent a strategic solution to
address the growing realization that the shortages of
highly skilled health workers will not meet the
growing demand of the rural population. As a result,
the need to systematically and professionally train lay
community members to be part of the health
workforce has emerged not simply as a stop-gap
measure, but as a core component of primary health
care systems in low-resource settings.” [7].
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was concern about CHW
effectiveness due to high-attrition rates, particularly when
smaller programmes attempted to go to scale [7]; however,
some long-standing and more recently initiated large-scale
programmes have shown promise [7-10]. Political will
and commitment have been evident in these successful
larger scale programmes, each of which has taken a some-
what different approach to training, supervising and re-
munerating CHWs [11-14]. Based on the experiences of
some of these countries, it is increasingly being suggested
that CHWs be paid and fully integrated into health sys-
tems [7]. Integration suggests clearly delineated responsi-
bilities within the health system, fair remuneration and, in
some cases, the possibility of a career path [7].
Debate on remuneration
While CHW programmes worldwide have taken a var-
iety of approaches to payment, many have operated withrelatively low budgets and engaged volunteers. Lack of
remuneration has been an often-stated cause of poor re-
tention of CHWs [3,8]. While this may be a contributing
factor, the desire to give of one’s time is determined by a
number of issues. Volunteers in wealthier countries gen-
erally have other incomes, such as pensions, spousal in-
come or part-time employment, and find it a meaningful
way to occupy their time or make a contribution to society.
In lower socio-economic environments – despite low-
education levels – building capacity to be able to contrib-
ute to one’s community is an important consideration. A
recent study in Uganda showed that CHWs while wishing
to be remunerated felt that issues such as community rec-
ognition and development of new skills and knowledge
[15] outweighed the disadvantage of a lack of funding. Reli-
gious beliefs and spirituality seem important in all contexts
[16]. The time one has to volunteer is, however, generally
determined by one’s income source. A female farmer in
Africa, for example, will have limited time to volunteer
compared to a pensioner in a higher income country.
Cherrington et al. [17] note that there are those who
feel that CHWs deserve to be paid and those who argue
that receiving a wage is contrary to the very nature of
lay advising but that there are legitimate arguments for
utilizing both the paid and volunteer models, depending
on the context, community needs and programme goals.
To avoid the loss of the important characteristics that
volunteers bring, it may be necessary to redefine what a
“CHW” is, as some take on higher levels of training and
a greatly expanded role in existing health systems.
Behavioural economics and remuneration of CHWs
Behavioural economics, which has gained attention in the
past decade among economists, psychologists and social
scientists, may provide some insights into CHW remuner-
ation, focus and motivation. While not completely reject-
ing neoclassical economics, behavioural economics does
challenge the assumptions on which it is built. Pink [18]
and Dawney and Shah [19] delineate a number of motiva-
tors that may be important and are responsive to “more
complex aspects of human nature” than are addressed by
neoclassical economics. These include autonomy, mastery,
purpose and connectedness (see Table 1). Additionally,
research emerging from the Harvard Business School
[20] suggests that behavioural economics, and particularly
“altruistic capital”, may have an important role in un-
derstanding the motivation of CHWs. Altruistic capital, as
defined by this group, means that every individual, in vary-
ing degrees, has within them an intrinsic desire to serve
others.
Heyman and Ariely [11] draw attention to a distinction
between monetary markets and social markets (see
Table 1), hypothesizing that “monetary markets are highly
sensitive to the magnitude of compensation, whereas social
Table 1 Motivators: according to behavioural economics
theory
Behavioural economists perspectives on motivation: internal and
external
Internal motivators (Pink [9]) External motivators (Heyman
and Ariely [11])
Autonomy: acting with choice,
does not exclude interdependence
with others. The opposite of
autonomy is control. Control leads
to compliance while autonomy
leads to engagement.
Monetary markets: when payments
were given in the form of cash,
effort seemed to stem from
reciprocation and was sensitive to
the magnitude of the payment.
Mastery: the desire to be better
and better at something that
matters.
Social markets and gifts: when
payments were given in the form
of gifts or when payments were
not mentioned, effort seemed to
stem from altruistic motives and
was largely insensitive to the
magnitude of the payment.
Purpose and connectedness: those
who work in service for a greater
purpose than themselves can
achieve more than those that do
not.
Mixed markets: the mere mention
of monetary payment was
sufficient to switch the perceived
relationship from a social-market
relationship to a money-market
relationship.
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established observation that people sometimes expend
more effort in exchange for no payment (a social market)
than they expend when they receive payment (a monetary
market). They conclude that, “mixed markets (markets
that include aspects of both social and monetary markets)
more closely resemble monetary than social markets”.
Incentives for health workers have also been proposed
as a means of improving health outcomes and have been
utilized in a number of settings, with varying degrees of
success. When discussing incentives for different cadres of
health professionals, Hongoro and McPake [21] acknow-
ledge the difficulties in designing incentives for health
workers that are financially based in that they may under-
mine the “ethos” of public service that motivates them.
Gifts and community recognition are considered to be
within the domain of social markets and appear to be im-
portant particularly for the motivation of both employed
individuals and volunteers, as they are considered to
reinforce rather than undermine efforts [11].
At a time when considerable attention is being paid to
how CHWs can be best utilized and integrated into the
health system, it seems necessary to try to distinguish
between approaches and motivators. The objective of
this review is to identify and examine different remuner-
ation models of CHWs that have been utilized in large-
scale sustained programmes to gain insight into the
effect that remuneration has on the motivation and
focus of the CHWs. Five models of CHW remuneration
will be considered as described in the “Methods” section
below.Case descriptions
Methods
In order to classify and examine different remuneration
models of CHWs, a MEDLINE search using Ovid SP was
conducted between September 2013 and May 2014 and
citation searches were also carried out. Search terms in-
cluded CHWs, remuneration, volunteers, behavioural eco-
nomics and health, motivation, payment and altruistic
capital. An initial 18 review and related articles, books
and theses were also identified, and the case studies se-
lected. A further 34 research articles (minimum of 5
per programme) and descriptions of the specific CHW
programmes were also identified by citation snowbal-
ling from the original journal articles. Selection criteria
for including programmes as case studies were those
that had been sustained for at least 5 years and had a
retention rate of 85% or more – this was taken as an
indicator of the sustainability of the programme. A
multiple case study approach [22] was selected rather
than a systematic review because of the lack of uniformity
in CHW programmes worldwide. All of the programmes
selected had broad experience, having trained at least 30
000 CHWs each. Programmes included had a minimum
of five relevant publications available for review. A
programme was not included if it trained fewer than
30 000 CHWs or was not sustained.
This proposed inquiry aimed to identify all relevant lit-
erature pertaining to the remuneration issues of selected
CHW programmes. The authors believed that a combin-
ation of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods
studies presented more enhanced insights and addressed
the research question. Hence, a mixed studies review
(MSR) was conducted that allowed a search strategy in-
cluding diverse designs.
The case studies provided a variety of documented
approaches to remuneration including (a) part-time
volunteers, working limited hours without regular fi-
nancial incentives: the Female Community Health Vol-
unteer (FCHV) programme from Nepal; (b) volunteers
that sell health merchandise: Bangladesh Rural Advance-
ment Committee (BRAC) Community Health Volunteer
(CHV) programme in Bangladesh; (c) volunteers with fi-
nancial incentives: the Accredited Social Health Activist
(ASHA) programme in India; (d) paid full-time CHWs:
the CHWs (Behvarzs) in Iran; and (e) both full-time and
volunteer CHWs working together: Health Extension
Programs (HEPs) in Ethiopia. Not all large-scale CHW
programmes have been included due to space limitations.
For example, the Brazilian government’s Community
Health Agent programme and Pakistan’s Lady Health
Worker programme [10] are examples of well-known and
documented paid full-time CHW programmes [7]. The
programme in Iran was selected because it has not re-
ceived as wide an exposure despite its success. The others
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approaches to remuneration, which lent themselves to a
useful contrast. Similarly, the multiple approaches taken
in the developed world/United States context, while of
interest, is beyond the scope of this paper [5,6].
Each of the case studies addressed three central ques-
tions – (a) What is the history and description of the
programme? (b) What has been the impact of the
programme? and (c) What have been the reported ef-
fects of the remuneration model? An initial case study
was prepared and compared with the set of questions
that were to be answered. Further literature searches
were undertaken until the questions were answered or it
was evident that the answers had not been published.
Table 2 summarizes the five CHW case studies consid-
ered in this paper.
Case studies
Part-time volunteer CHWs without financial incentives:
Female Community Health Volunteer programme in Nepal
History and description The programme in Nepal is a
volunteer-based programme that has been operating
since 1988. There are 48 000 FCHVs that generally vol-
unteer 5 h per week. The FCHVs are women, at least
20 years of age and literate where possible. If she is not
literate, she should be willing to attend literacy classes.
Preference is given to women who have been involved in
social action previously and who have one or two children
[9]. There is generally one FCHV for a population of 400
people, with smaller ratios of FCHV and people in hills
and mountains. The FCHVs receive an initial 15 days of
training with refresher courses every 6 months. The train-
ing is provided by health assistants, assistant nurse mid-
wives and auxiliary health workers under the direction of
the district health officer. The FCHVs develop knowledge
in the areas of basic family health and some skills in diag-
nosis of acute childhood illness including respiratory ill-
nesses and vitamin A deficiency. Supervision is not as
regular as might be needed and is done by government
village health workers. Refresher training is the major
form of supervision [9]. The FCHVs now receive a small
allowance for the days they attend training but work
essentially as volunteers.
Impact The FCHV programme has been attributed to
making a substantial contribution to reducing infant and
child morbidity and mortality. From 1986 to 1989, re-
search was conducted in Jumla, a remote mountainous
district in Nepal, which reported a 28% reduction in
under-5 mortality through active case finding and man-
agement of pneumonia by trained paid community-
based project workers using oral antibiotics [23]. This
validated results from a previous study by Pandey et al.
[24] showing a 59% ARI-specific mortality reductionwith community-based treatment of childhood pneumo-
nia. Following integration into the work of the FCHVs, a
mixed method evaluation showed that 19% of acute re-
spiratory infections were appropriately treated in health
centres by trained health professionals compared to 35%
by FCHVs [25,26]. Khanal et al. [27] found that FCHVs
who made home visits to newborn babies in the first
week of life were able to identify possible severe bacterial
infections in 90% of cases and refer to facilities thereby
reducing mortality rates from 5.3% to 1.5%. Shrestha [28]
showed that empowerment-based training of FCHVs in-
creased use of contraception from 0% to 52.3% among 241
married women.
The effects of the remuneration model While the
Female Community Health Volunteers were initially
paid, remuneration was discontinued after a year due to
lack of funds. This caused confusion in communities for
many years as well as unfulfilled expectations among
FCHVs. In a recent review of the programme, stakeholders
expressed concern about the possibility of the introduc-
tion of a salary to the sustainability of the programme.
They described that, “Whether you (government em-
ployee) work or not doesn’t matter. You go to the office,
you get paid. But for the FCHV’s it’s a social obligation at-
tached to their prestige…”. The perception that a health
worker is being paid somehow creates a negative feeling
in the Nepali society. The women in the programme
expressed that the main motivator was to earn religious
merit by serving their community; recognition by the
community and improving health of the community
were also mentioned. Other factors included acquisi-
tion of health knowledge, betterment of their family’s
health, a change from routine work and social recog-
nition. Others continue to hope for future benefits
through direct financial incentives or employment. The
women do receive gifts including bicycles, radios and
saris [9] in addition to awards, certificates and cere-
monies from the government and community.
Glenton et al. [29] suggest that the issue of monetary
versus social markets is critical to the success of the
programme, noting that monetary incentives to reward
social effort can be detrimental. They state that:
“Differentiating between FCHV’s’ intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations may not be useful as some of
these motivations, such as the (intrinsic) desire to
help others and the (extrinsic) social recognition this
leads to, are strongly intertwined. Nevertheless, our
study does illustrate that certain incentives have the
potential to undermine others. The assumption that
an individual’s motivation can be increased simply by
increasing the amount of material incentives appears
therefore to be wrong. Instead, we must understand
Table 2 Summary of CHW programmes in the case studies
Iran Behvarzs Ethiopia Health Extension
Workers – blended programme
of full time and part time









Monetary market: paid for
full-time work
Monetary market: paid for full-time
work
Mixed market: incentives Mixed market: selling of health
commodities
Social market: volunteers
Working hours Full time Full time Part time Part time 15–20 h Part-time 5–10 h per week
Current number 31 000 38 000 820 000 80 000 48 000
Minimum
education level
Completed high school Grade 10 Grade 8 Some years of school Literate if possible
Ratio 1:1500 1:2500 1:1000 1:1500 1:400
Training and
supervision
2 years full time, refresher
courses and monthly
meetings
1 year full time 23 days then attend weekly
meeting
Initial 21 days then supervised
2–3 times a month
Initial 15 days then refresher
once a month
Impact Reduced IMR, MMR, increased
life expectancy
Decreased MMR, IMR, increased family
planning, clean water, HIV tests
Increased facility-based deliveries,
decreased MMR and neonatal
mortality
NA Decreased IMR under-5 mor-
tality and morbidity
Retention Required to work for 4 years
in government service
93.5–99% over a 1- to 6-year period NA 84–89% 85% over 5 years
Advantages High-retention rates, high-
quality service in rural areas
High coverage, allows for extension
of health services and community
engagement
Increased coverage for specific
health interventions
Marginalized women have a chance to earn
small incomes and to engage in health
High levels of community
good will and support
Disadvantages High cost, long training
period before starting to work
High cost, long training period
before starting to work
Focus on incentivized health
interventions
Focus on selling health commodities could
distract from health issues
Other commitments may
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motivations when selecting appropriate incentives.”
They note [29] that the “crowding theory” developed
by Frey and Jegan in 2001, which states that extrinsic
goals, coming from outside, can crowd out intrinsic
goals where the person receives no apparent rewards ex-
cept the activity itself, is relevant to volunteer CHWs. In
this case, the intrinsic motivation received from serving
the community may result from a feeling that the work
is worthwhile or from the satisfaction gained from
achieving goals [29].
Volunteers that sell health merchandise: Community Health
Volunteer programme in Bangladesh
History and description BRAC began in 1972 as a
small relief organization. It has expanded its efforts to
integrated sustainable development, poverty alleviation
through microfinance and healthcare. Serving 110
million people in Bangladesh, it has 117 000 staff and
80 000 Community Health Volunteers (CHVs) and has
now expanded its efforts to 10 other countries [30]. The
CHVs, also known as Shasthya Shebikas, are generally
25 years of age or older, married with children not below
2 years, have had some years of schooling, willing to
provide voluntary services and acceptable to the com-
munity they serve. They receive 3 weeks of training to
distribute family planning methods, identify pregnant
women, provide essential newborn care and postnatal
visits, assist with deliveries, provide special care to low
birth weight babies, manage diarrhoea and acute respira-
tory infections of children, oversee TB treatment, treat
minor ailments and sell health commodities. They are
then expected to provide home-based health education,
treatment of basic health problems, health data collec-
tion, sell medicines and health commodities and make
referrals to health centres as necessary [31].
According to UNICEF [9], BRAC has a strong moni-
toring and evaluation programme which it uses to iden-
tify weaknesses and correct them before expanding its
efforts. BRAC provides supportive supervision with a
programme organizer (PO) supervising 25–30 CHVs
two to three times a month. Statistics from 2006 to 2008
have found attrition rates of 11.6% in rural areas and
15.5% in urban areas. This may, however, be higher in
some places – with a 20% to 32% attrition rate reported
in a study by Alam et al. [32]. Reported motivational fac-
tors for remaining in the programme vary. Women from
often-marginalized communities gain community recog-
nition and skills; however, the income generated is also
important to the women. The incentive and income
structure is based on three main approaches. The health
workers are considered volunteers that can get a second
loan from BRAC, sell health commodities to make asmall profit and charge a small service fee for antenatal
care. The average number of years women had been
working in the 2011 [32] study was 5.8, with an average
of 3.6 h per day spent in the field and 14 homes visited a
day. Average income was $14 per month.
Impact Little data on the impact of the CHVs on health
outcomes is available. Alam et al. [32] note that the major-
ity of the previous studies on CHVs do not provide a
rigorous analysis regarding the extent to which different
factors affect their performance. Well-trained CHVs were
significantly better at identifying acute respiratory infec-
tions in children under 5 years of age in a case–control
study of 120 volunteers [33]. Islam et al. [34] found that
BRAC CHVs had as high a cure rate among patients with
tuberculosis as government health workers (84% versus
82%) but for a lower cost (US$ 64 versus US$ 96).
The effects of the remuneration model For the BRAC
CHVs, the financial incentives are a strong source of
motivation. Reichenbach and Shimul [31] note that 86%
of the respondents in a study of the CHVs said they had
become a CHV “to contribute to the income of their
household”, with 3% stating “social recognition” and 1%
reporting “helping her community”. In one study, it was
noted that CHVs perceived themselves as “salesperson
aiming to make a profit” instead of a volunteer worker
[30]. Insufficient profit for their time and family members
being unhappy with their work were the most frequently
cited reasons for dropping out of the programme [9]. It
seems therefore that funding arrangements can determine
the way in which the CHW understands their purpose.
Volunteers with financial incentives: the Accredited Social
Health Activist (ASHA) programme in India
History and description The Accredited Social Health
Activists (ASHAs) programme began in 2005 as a strategy
under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in
India. The ASHAs are mostly females aged 25–45 with an
8th grade qualification [35]. According to Gopalan et al.
[36] in 2011, there had been a total of 820 000 women that
had been trained and deployed by 2011. They receive
23 days of training and are expected to attend weekly
meetings at the local primary health centre with auxiliary
nurse midwives. The ASHAs were envisioned to have
three roles according to the National Institute of Health
and Family Welfare in 2005. These were as follows: (1)
service extenders to achieve government policy goals, (2)
bridges between the rural people and the health service
outlets and (3) social change agents to create awareness of
the social determinants of health and mobilizing the
community toward health planning and utilization of local
health services [2]. Rather than a fixed stipend, the
ASHAs receive performance-based payments for particular
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Yojana (JSY) programme, which provides a conditional
cash transfer scheme to promote deliveries in institutions –
$35 for the woman delivering and $15 for the ASHA who
brings her to the health facility [37]. Additional payments
might be given for promotion of immunization, family
planning including sterilization for men and women, dis-
pensing of TB medication, leprosy detection and referral
and organization of village health nutrition days [38]. Paul
et al. [37] note that the Indian primary healthcare system
aimed to improve maternal and child health outcomes is
challenged because of a “lack of capacity for training and
supervision, lack of ownership…, lack of review and moni-
toring nationally and in states, inability to integrate the re-
ferral component and non-availability of line supervisors”.
Impact India has not achieved coverage of more than
55% for any of the priority interventions for reproductive
health and child health and nutrition. Forty-six per cent of
infants were exclusively breastfed for the first 6 months of
life in 2007–2008, and 24% received solid feeds and
breastfeeds at 6–9 months [37]. There has, however, been
an increase in facility-based deliveries of 8%, from 29.8%
to 37.8% between 2002–2004 and 2007–2009 [39] in some
areas where incentives for institutional-based deliveries
are operating and a decline by 70% in neonatal mortality
in areas with incentives linked to these targeted services
[37-39]. The programme did not, however, seem to effect-
ively reach the poorest of the poor [39]. Das et al. [40] sug-
gest that the data from Lim et al. [39] misrepresents the
success of the programme and that the percentage of
women delivering at a health facility and receiving the in-
centive is lower than reported.
The effects of the remuneration model There is con-
flicting information about the impact of incentives on
the motivation of the CHWs in the ASHA programme.
Gopalan [36] found that individual- and community-
level factors, a sense of responsibility and feelings of
self-efficacy were the main motivators for the 386
ASHAs interviewed in the state of Orissa. Others, how-
ever, suggest that financial remuneration is one of the
key motivational factors [38] and that delays in pay-
ments are a disincentive for ASHAs and undermine
their motivation to perform [41].
Nandan et al. [41] note that most ASHAs spend their
time in areas linked to incentives and that many other
tasks, such as health education, get less attention due to
lack of incentives. Wang quoting Oxman and Fretheim
in 2008 notes:
“Although performance based payment increases the
quantity of health services delivered, it may also have
unintended economic effects, such as distortion(neglect of important tasks that are not rewarded with
financial incentives), gaming (improving or cheating
on reporting rather than improving performance),
corruption, cherry picking (serving easy-to-reach
patients), widening the resource gap between the
rich and poor, dependency on financial incentives,
demoralization and bureaucratization” [38].
Thirty-three per cent of the ASHAs feels that their
income is not reasonable in view of their efforts, and the
delay in the payment of incentives has undermined their
motivation. Scott and Shanker [2] found that ASHAs
were institutionally limited by (1) the outcome-based re-
muneration structure, (2) poor institutional support, (3)
the rigid hierarchical structure of the health system and
(4) a dearth of participation at the community level.
They felt that the ASHAs were achieving partial success
as service extenders [2] but that the incentive system
was preventing them from being cultural mediators or
broader social change agents.
Paid full-time CHWs – Behvarz programme in Iran
History and description The Behvarz (CHW) programme
in Iran began in 1979 [42]. The Behvarzs work at health
houses – the most basic unit of the health system in Iran.
The CHWs (one male and one female for each village) are
selected by the communities, should have completed high
school, been resident in the community for at least 1 year
and be trained for a period of 2 years during which they
receive accommodation and financial support. There are
currently 31 000 Behvarzs in Iran – 1 per 1500 population
[42]. University graduates are employed to provide train-
ing in three blocks during the 2 years. Funds come from
the annual budget of the national and provincial health
systems. The training has also recently been offered as a
university course to improve standards. There are monthly
refresher courses and supervisory visits from health cen-
tres. The Behvarzs are involved in multiple tasks including
home visits for health promotion, immunization of chil-
dren, breastfeeding, use of iodized salt, screening and
follow-up of chronic illnesses and appropriate treatment
for children suffering from diarrhoea and acute respiratory
infections. They also ensure the rural population has ac-
cess to vaccines, essential drugs and oral rehydration
[43-46] and referral to an urban centre for specialized care
[47]. In addition to a salary, there are additional incentives
including training allowances, celebration of a “National
Behvarz Day”, creation of the “excellent Behvarz award”
and provision of personal loans [42,48,49].
Impact Improvements in health indicators in Iran have
been ascertained by census data; national health surveys
which include questions about nutrition, child health
and family planning; and death registries [43]. Iran has
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mortality rates that have been attributed, in part, to the
Behvarz programme [43,49]. Mortality rates among infants
and children younger than 5 years decreased from 93 and
135 deaths per 1000 live births in 1974 to 29 and 36 deaths
per 1000 live births in 2000, respectively. In addition, the
maternal mortality ratio, recognized as a sensitive indica-
tor of both development and health services, decreased
sharply from 140 to 24 deaths per 100 000 live births
between 1985 and 2007. Life expectancy increased from
55.7 years in 1976 to 71.6 years in 2003. Specifically, im-
provement in management in diabetes and hypertension,
reduced goitre and improved immunization and breast-
feeding rates have been attributed to Behvarzs [42,45]. Of
particular interest has been the narrowing of the gaps be-
tween the rural and urban areas [42].
The effects of the remuneration model The Behvarz
programme requires high levels of government commit-
ment with payment as both students and when engaged
full time in the community. The Behvarz then commits
a minimum of 4 years to government service [42,48]. As
might be expected, higher levels of mastery have been
achieved in this type of programme where a minimum
basic educational level is required and which provides
higher quality training and meaningful supervision. In
some ways, the programme in Iran, which offers two full
years of training, has become more like an auxiliary or
enrolled nurse programme than a CHW programme.
The Behvarz programme includes 13 months of super-
vised clinical training [42]. The Ministry of Health has
shown a high commitment to learning about the needs
of the community and offering training in response to
these.
Both full-time and part-time volunteer CHWs – Health
Extension Worker programme in Ethiopia
History and description The Health Extension Worker
(HEW) programme began in 2003. The programme’s ob-
jectives are to provide “a package of basic and essential
promotive, preventive and curative health services target-
ing households in a community, based on the principle of
Primary Health Care (PHC) to improve the family’s health
status with their full participation” [12]. Since January
2004, 38 000 HEWs have been trained. The HEWs, young
local women with grade 10 education levels, are given
1 year training prior to employment with the woreda
(district) health office. They work from a health post in
their community, with a ratio of five health posts for every
health centre. The HEW works with 5000 people and
spends 75% of her time in the field. Alone, it has not
been possible for the HEWs to reach the whole popula-
tion, and the community health promotion programme
is centred on volunteer community health promoters(vCHPs), working under the supervision and guidance of
the HEWs and more recently the Health Development
Armies (HDAs), who are members of model families [13].
The programme focuses on four major areas and provides
16 different packages, which the HEW, vCHPs and HDAs
are trained to use with 50–60 model households over a
96-h period during 3 to 4 months on topics including the
following: hygiene and environmental sanitation, family
health services, disease prevention and control and health
education and communication. Training is offered to any
interested members of “model families” from teenagers to
grandparents. Those that show interest or potential then
become vCHPs who work with the HEWs to extend their
reach and to train and collaborate in community action
with other model families [13]. Through this combination
of full-time and volunteer workers, much greater coverage
can be achieved especially when they share the same
goals.
Impact In 2010, detailed reports were compiled analys-
ing strengths and weaknesses of the HEW programme
by the Centre for National Health Development in
Ethiopia, the Earth Institute at Columbia University and
the Ministry of Health in Ethiopia [13,14,50]. Early re-
sults from areas where HEWs, vCHPs and HDAs are de-
ployed are encouraging: contraceptive use, clean water
sources and pit latrines, HIV testing and antenatal visits
all appear to be increasing. However, delivery, postnatal
and outpatient health services were not sought from
health posts with women preferring to have their babies
at home [14,50]. In 1990, the under-5 mortality rate was
one of the highest in the world at 204/1000 live births;
by 2012, this rate had been reduced to 68/1000 live
births [51]. Datiko and Lindtjørn [52] in a randomized
controlled trial found that the involvement of HEWs im-
proved case detection and treatment success for TB.
The HEW programme is still in a relatively early stage
of development and appears to have an ongoing commit-
ment to understanding the weaknesses of the HEWs and
improving them. So far, the HEWs have achieved mastery
in certain areas, including family planning and health and
environmental education, with improvements in a number
of health indicators. The government has shown a com-
mitment to further improve their mastery in other areas,
including diagnostics and treatment of common illnesses
through improved training and supervision.
The effects of the remuneration model The full-time
HEW programme of Ethiopia has achieved a great deal
of government support. Like the Behvarz programme, it
has required considerable financial commitment from
the government. This high level of commitment has
translated into an ongoing learning process that has en-
abled the HEW programme to evolve according to the
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ing that has taken place within the country. There was a
recent realization that the HEWs may not be able to ful-
fil all of the health needs of the community. Through a
process of consultation with the HEWs, it became evi-
dent that they were less content with their remuneration
as they were required to fulfil more goals. In 2011, the
majority (96.6%) of HEWs believed that they were
underpaid considering their heavy workloads [12]. A re-
sponse to this problem was to have greater involvement
of vCHPs and members of model families, the Health
Development Armies, who were then able to increase
coverage as demands grew. This has shown some prom-
ising results with increasing levels of community engage-
ment through this process.
Discussion and evaluation
The purpose of this review is to understand broadly five re-
muneration models utilized by large-scale, well-established
CHW training programmes in different parts of the world
and to gain insight into their effect on the motivation and
focus of the CHWs and how this might impact on govern-
ment planning of CHW programmes.
Motivation and focus
From the information available in the literature, it ap-
pears that – according to behavioural economics theory
– CHWs work best within a social or monetary market
rather than a mixed market [11,18,20]. A social market
is one where volunteering one’s time for the common
good, social status and community appreciation are the
most important motivators whereas the monetary mar-
ket is one in which the CHWs are trained and work full
time and are remunerated for the hours expected of
them. Because of the nature of the work, both groups
benefit from a strong sense of service to their commu-
nity or altruistic capital [20]. Both full-time and volun-
teer CHWs can become demotivated if they do not have
access to adequate training, quality supervision, commu-
nity acceptance or appreciation or if they are expected
to work longer hours than they can realistically manage
while fulfilling their other commitments. Full-time paid
CHWs can further lose motivation if their allowances
are not provided in a timely fashion.
The use of incentives or low remuneration, which falls
into the category of a mixed market according to behav-
ioural economics, such as in the ASHA programme in
India, appears to create an environment where intrinsic
motivation can be lost, focus is placed on incentives and
discontent can occur. Time-consuming means to raise
funds such as the sale of commodities can prevent part-
time CHWs, who have many other responsibilities, from
focusing on health issues. The use of gifts and commu-
nity appreciation seems to be of value to all CHWs.Remuneration models can also affect the health prob-
lems on which the CHW focuses, which is also important
for planners to take into consideration. These case studies
showed that the programmes that utilized volunteers or
full-time paid CHWs or a combination of the two, suc-
cessfully achieved community engagement with communi-
ties taking ownership for change. When planners are
looking for health extenders [2] to fulfil existing govern-
ment goals, incentives were effective. For example, when
children needed to be mobilized for immunization or
mothers escorted to health centres for antenatal visits or
delivery, an incentive can be provided to a trained CHW
who will help fulfil these goals. If, however, the goal is
mixed – community engagement and incentivized health
work – the focus of these CHWs is predominantly on
areas where incentives exist with little or no time given to
community empowerment. Financial incentives can also
lend themselves to falsification, and the CHWs can be-
come demotivated and discontent if they feel the funds
are inadequate or there is a delay in them reaching the
CHW.
Categories
Categories of CHW remuneration differ according to
the purpose of the CHW programme, the context in
which it operates, commitment by the government and
the funds available. Throughout the course of the case
studies, it became increasingly evident that defining
CHWs as “lay persons who have received some training
to deliver healthcare services but are not professionals”
[1] may no longer be adequate to encompass the range
of roles being undertaken by this cadre of individuals.
All of the programmes had high-retention rates and con-
tributed, albeit in different ways, to improving health
outcomes in the communities they were working. How-
ever, comparing the work of a Behvarz in Iran who has
received 2 years of university-based training and is
employed full-time in government service with a FCHV
in Nepal who receives 15 days of training and works
with the community 5 h per week does not seem useful.
Despite the higher level of mastery that the Behvarzs
achieved, the role of the FCHVs might be seen as equally
important as they demonstrated high levels of commu-
nity trust that government workers, at least in the Nep-
alese setting, may have failed to do. Having two broader
categories – (1) CHWs that are trained to be part of the
formal work force and paid according and (2) CHWs
that receive minimal training and offer limited hours ac-
cording to the context – may be more useful.
Role of the government
Countries that have successfully managed to begin the
long process of addressing their rural health needs have
done so with high levels of government commitment
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rethinking at every level. This is particularly evident in
Ethiopia and Iran but is also seen in Nepal [1,12-14,48,49].
Whether paid or voluntary, the role of being a rural-based
CHW is a demanding one, and selecting the right candi-
date who is community minded, resilient, can withstand
challenges in the field and able to solve problems innova-
tively will be important whether paid or not. Presenting
the programme in a way that builds the individual’s altru-
istic capital may be important for planners to consider.
Equally, having a regular flow of funds to the CHWs if re-
munerated is important to avoid demotivation.
Limitations
It was decided to include only one case study for each
type in order to achieve some depth of understanding.
This resulted in the loss of what could have been learned
if we were able to include more examples. Comparison
is difficult due to the diverse nature of the case studies.
Even for sustained programmes, it was often difficult to
find quality direct impact data on the effectiveness of
the CHWs but rather showed improvement in overall
health in that country. The challenges in defining a
“CHW” have been discussed elsewhere in the paper.
Conclusion
The case studies examined in this paper show that a
number of different approaches to CHW training and
remuneration can be successful. According to the type
of outcomes intended for the CHW, and the context,
planners might choose one type of remuneration over
another. While the case studies focused on the develop-
ing world context, it can equally be applied in wealthier
countries. Categorizing according to (1) CHWs that are
trained to be part of the formal work force and paid ac-
cordingly and (2) CHWs that receive minimal training
and offer limited hours according to the context, pro-
vides a means by which selection criteria, expectations,
remuneration, training, roles and expectations can more
easily be delineated without losing the benefits of either
approach.
The case studies show that the issue of payment is more
complex than might initially appear and can undermine
the programme if not thought through well. If payment or
incentives are perceived as inadequate or do not flow in a
timely fashion, then this can be demotivating to the CHW.
Part-time models should not place unrealistic expectations
on the CHW’s time or capacity. Maximizing community
appreciation and altruistic capital within the programme
is also important for planners. Other models will no doubt
emerge, and quality research is needed to understand the
relationship between remuneration and motivation. Re-
muneration does not, however, stand alone, and ongoing
research will be needed to understand the complex issuesof community engagement, CHW appreciation, mean-
ingful supervision and the relationship and need for
paid and unpaid human resources in a system that can
empower the communities to improve health. Govern-
ments and planners have an opportunity to examine
the most cost effective and sustainable models that can
increase community engagement and thereby reduce
the overall healthcare costs.
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